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Introduction 
 
The globalisation process together with technological advancements, dilution 
of trade barriers and liberalisation as well as privatisation programs have shaped the 
global landscape, which has resulted in the augmentation of cross-border businesses. 
The expansion of businesses beyond the national borders has raised the issues of 
international anti-competitive practices. On the one hand, businesses are becoming 
international, whereas competition laws are national with their curbs and limits. Due 
to these boundaries, national competition authorities are unable to address 
international anti-competitive behaviour effectively, especially if the authority lacks 
experience, knowledge or resources and does not have vision when the anti-
competitive issues are transcending their domestic boundaries. As a result, some 
international anti-competitive transactions can escape any regulatory mechanism.  On 
the other hand, globalisation and therefore international anti-competitive practices 
have driven competition authorities to apply their laws beyond national boundaries. 
Many countries have introduced the extra-territoriality principle, where national 
competition authorities apply their domestic law to extra-territorial conduct that has 
effects in their nations. Hence, extra-territorial effects of competition bring various 
countries competition laws into contact and quite often in confrontation. Apart from 
the harm that may be caused to the relationship between the different countries, 
conflicting results may be damaging to the firms concerned, who usually are agitated 
if their transactions are subjected by various competition authorities. For instance, if a 
cross-border merger was approved by one side of the Atlantic, but blocked by the 
other, this conflicting result would place an unnecessary burden on the undertakings 
involved. Firms are concerned about the cost of their international transactions due to 
these conflicting or duplicative policies by different national competition authorities. 
Problems in dealing with these cross-border challenges have brought scholars and 
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practitioners as well as various international organisations together to discuss 
harmonisation of international competition law and its importance in today’s global 
world. Hence, this article will discuss the prospect of harmonisation of international 
competition law in the light of the WTO, its past, present and future. It will also 
evaluate the benefits and the pitfalls of international competition law, as to whether 
the notion of “one size fits all” could be the best solution for competition law in an 
international context, especially from the position of small and developing countries. 
The question will be raised as to what are the strengths and limitations of the WTO in 
harmonising and enforcing international competition law. 
 
Globalisation and competition policy 
 
The globalisation process together with technological advancements, domestic 
government policies with the opening up of borders for foreign traders and signing up 
to the international and/or regional organisations, dilution of trade barriers and 
customs distortions, liberalisation of capital movement and investment, and 
privatisation programs have changed the global landscape over time, where global 
transactions whirl over national borders bringing businesses together. As markets and 
competition become increasingly international, so do anti-competitive practices by 
firms. The international dimension of competition challenges has become more 
prominent. The difference between national and international anti-competitive 
practices lies in the cross-border dimension of anti-competitive behaviour, which is 
harder to challenge. The examples of anti-competitive practices that can cause global 
economic damage are international anti-competitive agreements or concerted 
practices, anti-competitive merger transactions with spill-over effects and abuse of 
global dominant firms. Practices of this nature can lead to the transfer of wealth from 
consumers in one country to producers in another. Consequently, consumers in one or 
more countries will bear directly or indirectly the cost of these unlawful activities, 
which may result in higher prices and reduced choice. Competition law together with 
competition enforcement institutions were introduced to many jurisdictions in the 
world. However, the governments from different jurisdictions have soon realised that 
national competition law could not give a final solution as trade has been increasing 
globally whereas competition law is national. In a global world where multinational 
firms become dominant, national competition authorities face difficulties in regulating 
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these cross-border anti-competitive activities. While domestic markets are regulated 
by national authorities through their competition law or other measures, there is 
hardly any mechanism for regulating the international market with regard to 
competition law issues.  
Globalisation has significant impact for competition policy and law in the 
global economy; it has almost made it inevitable to change competition law. As a 
response to these international competition issues, the harmonisation of international 
competition law has evolved into a topic of significant contemporary importance. 
Scholars and practitioners around the world have questioned whether there is a 
necessity to set up a global competition agency in order to enforce international 
competition law and if yes, which one international body is the most suitable and 
what role should it play in order to enforce the principles of international competition. 
Many organisations, such as the International Competition Network (the ICN)1, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the OECD)2, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (the UNSTAD)3 and others have 
considered or even introduced soft law to deal with international competition issues. 
The Wold Trade Organisation (the WTO) is not an exception.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The ICN is devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement. Although, it does not exercise any 
rule-making function, the ICN can issue recommendations or “best practices” and then individual 
competition authorities decide whether and how to implement the recommendations, through unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate. For further information, see web-site: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 
2 The OECD has been active in encouraging soft convergence amongst member countries by adopting a 
number of non-binding Recommendations on competition law and policy.  For instance,  OECD 
Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance (2005), Best Practices for the Formal 
Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations (2005), 
Recommendation of the Council concerning merger review (2005), Recommendation of the Council 
concerning structural separation in regulated industries (2001), Recommendation of the Council 
concerning effective action against hard core cartels (1998), and Recommendation of the Council 
concerning co-operation between member countries on anticompetitive practices affecting international 
trade (1995). For further discussion, see  web-site: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_34535_4599739_1_1_1_1,00.html  
3 The UNCTAD provides national competition authorities from developing countries and economies in 
transition with an intergovernmental forum for addressing practical competition law and policy issues. 
It is also a depository of international competition legislations, the Model Law on Competition 
(TD/RBP/Conf.5/7/Rev.2)and the United Nations Set of Principles on Competition 
((td/rbp/conf/10/rev.2) 01/01/01).  
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Competition issues and the predecessors of the WTO   
 
Despite the absence of binding competition rules within the WTO, 
competition issues have been an important question within the international trading 
system for some time. Already in 1948 the draft of the 1948 Havana Charter, which 
was aimed at establishing the International Trade Organisation (the ITO), addressed 
issues on restrictive business practices. Article 46 of the Charter imposed an 
obligation on member countries to prevent firms from engaging in activities that 
‘restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control whenever 
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade’4. 
However, the ITO never materialised and the Charter was deemed to fail after the US 
Senate objected partly because the US’s concern over inability to enforce its own anti-
trust law. All that survived after the ITO was the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GATT5), which in 1995 was superseded by the WTO6. The GATT was 
designed to provide a general framework that encouraged free trade between 
contracting nations by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by 
providing a common mechanism for resolving trade disputes. The explicit aim of 
GATT is to eliminate all trade restrictions. Article III (para 4) of the GATT provides 
that “[..] the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin”. Although the 
GATT prohibits trade restrictions on international trade, it does not directly address 
anti-competitive issues7. Nonetheless, the contracting parties adopted a decision that 
the members should consult with each other concerning allegedly restrictive business 
practices8. The GATT helped to establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading 
system that became more liberal through rounds of trade negotiations; however, by 
                                                 
4 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, UN Doc. E/Conf.2?78 1948, available from 
web-site:  http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf 
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
6 For further discussion, see C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, 1949 and W.A. Brown, Jr, The 
United States and the Restoration of World Trade, 1950. 
7 Though several articles to some extent address anti-competitive issues, for instance, article III on 
National Treatment; article XI on prohibition of quantitative restrictions; article VIII of GATS on 
monopoly service supplier providers etc. 
8 Decision on Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, November 18, 1960, 
GATT, B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 28. 
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1980s the system needed to be reformed. This led to the Uruguay Round and 
subsequently to the WTO. 
 
Competition issues and the WTO   
In 1995 the GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organisation (the 
WTO). The WTO is an organisation that deals with the rules of trade between nations 
at a global or near-global level. It has a multi-functional task being an organisation for 
liberalising trade, a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements, and a place 
to settle trade disputes9. Despite these roles, the WTO is not Superman and cannot 
solve all the world’s problems. This can be seen from a limited power of the WTO 
dispute settlement to deal with competition issues. The globalisation process has 
brought trade law and competition law into contact; anti-competitive practices have 
been recognised by some scholars10 as the next ‘generation’ of barriers to trade in the 
world. Anti-competitive behaviour by private firms that can affect the flows of trade 
and investment between countries has increased in recent years. Although the efforts 
of the international community have been on removing barriers to the flow of trade, 
anti-competitive practices of firms that hinder the expansion of world trade have not 
been left unnoticed. The first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 
formed the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
“to study issues raised by Members relating to the interaction between trade and 
competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas 
that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework”11. This Group was 
given a mandate to explore these issues with the possibility of negotiating an 
agreement. It meant to cover a wide range of issues, including the impact of 
competition on trade and vice versa the impact of trade policy on competition, 
gathering information from member countries and evaluating alternatives of 
                                                 
9 For further reading, see web-site: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm 
(accessed 10/06/2008) 
10 See, for instance, K. Lee, The WTO dispute settlement and anti-competitive practices: lessons learnt 
from trade disputes, the University of Oxford press, Working paper, 10/05. 
11 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Conference Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W 13 December 
1996, 96-5315, at para 20. For further discussion, see web-site: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/min96_e.htm (accessed 10/06/2008) 
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international co-operations12. This promising start can be further seen in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, where Ministers “recognized the case for a multilateral 
framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade 
and development, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-
building in this area”13. They instructed the Working Group to focus on the 
clarification of the following: core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness; hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary 
cooperation; and support for reinforcement of competition authorities in developing 
countries through capacity building. Unfortunately, during the subsequent meetings, 
members failed to reach a consensus on the content of possible competition rules, 
with much of the opposition coming from small and developing countries that feared 
intrusive competition law enforcement designed by developed countries. Thus, 
negotiations on competition policy ended in deadlock at the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference in 2003. According to Stewart, this was because of a range of political 
issues rather than technical objections to a multilateral framework for competition 
policy in the WTO14. With a promising start, the last step adopted by the WTO is 
rather disappointing. In the so called “July 2004 package” the WTO General Council 
marked that the issue of competition policy “will not form part of the Work 
Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations 
on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round”15. 
Hence, the Working Group is currently inactive and the Doha Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, launched in November 2001 under the aegis of the WTO, remains 
stalled. According to Jackson, the WTO's reluctance to explicitly address competition 
policy could be explained by various constitutional and procedural constraints16. For 
example, it is difficult to harmonise existing national regimes into a single standard, 
especially since national competition policies not only employ different standards but 
                                                 
12 M.Yun, Trade and Competition Policy in WTO, Chapter 7, In: Regional Perspectives on the WTO 
Agenda: Concerns and common Interests, pp. 122, available from web-site: 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/chap7_2161.pdf  
13 WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 14 November 2001, at paras 23-25, 
available from web-site: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/history_e.htm 
14 For further discussion, see T. Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or 
Substance?, 2004 31(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 7. 
15 WTO, The General Council’s post-Cancun decision, the “July 2004 package”, WT/L/579 2 August 
2004, at para (g), available from web-site: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm 
16 J. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge 
university press, 2006. 
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also require complex factual determinations of changed performance in specific 
markets as a result of designated actions, for instance, for tying agreements, parallel 
import restrictions, and merger transaction deals. Despite this deadlock at the WTO, 
the following section will discuss the possible benefits that international competition 
law may offer. 
Benefits of international competition law harmonisation and the WTO 
Due to the globalisation process, there has been a significant rise in the 
number of large cross-border transactions, potentially requiring clearance from a 
multitude of national competition authorities. Also, the detection of anti-competitive 
practices, for instance, in hard-core cartel cases or merger transactions with spill-over 
effects, affecting multiple jurisdictions have surged. Such anti-competitive practices 
have harmful consequences for society at large, and therefore can create private 
obstacles to market access nullifying the advances made by governments in trade 
liberalisation and regulatory reform. These issues could be potentially solved through 
international competition law mechanism. Harmonisation is arguably desirable for its 
efficiency effects, which, for instance, can reduce the burdensome costs of legal 
uncertainty imposed by divergent local standards. The EU among other countries have 
advocated in favour of the harmonisation or internationalisation of competition law, 
most notably under the auspices of the WTO. This is because the WTO has a near 
universal membership; it can provide a balanced response sensitive to the varying 
interests and concerns of both developed and developing countries; the WTO is the 
recognised institution for trade related international economic rules, which are closely 
related to competition issues (some of its Agreements already have a number of 
specific provisions to address anticompetitive practices, i.e. in the area of anti-
dumping); the institutional infrastructure of the WTO includes a system of 
transparency and surveillance through notification requirements and monitoring 
provisions; it contains the general rules relating to non-discrimination and 
transparency; the WTO also provides a forum for continuous negotiation and 
consultation, where its members could bring their trade-related competition concerns; 
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and most importantly the WTO has a well established, reinforced and legalised 
dispute settlement mechanism between governments17.  
Presuming that the WTO is the best body for the job, it can provide the 
following benefits with regard to international competition issues. First of all, Brittan 
and Van Miert expressed that international competition rules may help tackle market 
access issues. For instance, anti-competitive practices keep European firms out of 
third country markets and they cannot, in the absence of proper enforcement measures 
in those third country markets, be effectively dealt with without international rules. 
European firms also face a competitive disadvantage if they have to compete on world 
markets with foreign producers operating from home markets that are subject to lax 
competition policies. In this context multilateral rules would promote more equal 
conditions of competition world-wide.  
Secondly, international competition rules can help to avoid conflicts of law 
and jurisdiction between countries and to promote a gradual convergence of 
competition laws18. As aforementioned, some competition authorities, including the 
EU and US, apply the ‘effect doctrine’ to deal with international anti-competitive 
practices assuming jurisdiction even if all the conduct complained of takes place in 
other countries. However, jurisdiction is a central and vital attribute of state 
sovereignty; a country is able to enact and enforce laws within its boundaries and 
must not intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations. Thus, the issues of public 
international law may arise here, where public international law sets down rules to 
limit a state’s exercise of government functions in another forum. The problem is that 
some countries may not appreciate extra-territorial reach into their domestic 
competition law system, especially if they do not have a similar belief as to what 
constitutes anti-competitive harm. Sovereignty concerns may limit the potential 
                                                 
17 Communication submitted by Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert towards an international 
framework of competition rules Communication to the Council, Com(96)284, available from web-site: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/international/com284.html. Also, see M. Dabbah, The 
Internationalisation of Antitrust policy, Cambridge university press, 2003, pp. 224. 
 
18 Communication submitted by Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert towards an international 
framework of competition rules Communication to the Council, Com(96)284 
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benefits of extra-territoriality19. It means that national competition authorities may fall 
short of providing a remedy when more than one jurisdiction is involved, especially 
when it comes to collecting information and evidence from foreign countries. This is 
why there is a real need to minimise the jurisdictional conflicts, not only from the 
extra-territorial application of certain competition laws, but also from the application 
of competition law to anti-competitive practices conceived abroad but implemented 
within one's jurisdiction.  
Thirdly, apart from sovereignty concerns, other problems can also occur in the 
application of the ‘effect doctrine’ by various competition authorities. The same 
international transaction can be subjected to different competition authorities which 
imposes conflicting obligations on firms. One might say that firms in question need 
simply to confirm their conduct to whichever competition law regime is more 
restrictive. However, this can lead to global overregulation20.  Furthermore, conflict in 
policy objectives may also occur, for instance, in the cases where one country allows 
certain conduct generally agreed on the conclusion that its pro-competitive effects are 
likely to outweigh any anti-competitive concerns. For another country to restrict that 
conduct is thus to deny those pro-competitive effects to the first nation, which is 
contrary to its policy preferences. This can instigate policy conflicts where countries 
differ on what counts as pro-competitive effects and to what extent they should be 
taken into consideration21. Convergence of competition laws can reduce contradictory 
decisions (or duplicative proceedings) and therefore curtail firms’ costs and time of 
compliance with competition laws or any conflicts in their competition policies and 
most importantly increase the legal certainty for firms operating in different 
jurisdictions. 
Finally, there is the necessity for an international instrument with a binding 
notion to respond to globalisation and trans-national transactions. This is because the 
non-binding nature of current agreements might not always provide satisfactory 
results. Many countries which have implemented comprehensive competition policies, 
nonetheless, lack the necessary knowledge, experience or even resources to apply 
domestic competition rules to anti-competitive practices with an international 
                                                 
19 D. Sokol, Monopolists without borders: the Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a 
Global Gilded Age, Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 4.1, 2007, pp. 46. 
20 Suggested by Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart, 2007, pp.1011-
1012. 
21 For further discussion, see Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart, 
2007, pp.1011-1012. 
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dimension. Lack of any competition laws in a number of jurisdictions worldwide adds 
to further international problems. All these issues suggest the importance and 
necessity for international competition law rules. However, these benefits do not 
come without costs. Thus, the following section will examine what are the pitfalls of 
international competition law harmonisation. 
 
“One size fits all” - the pitfalls of international competition law harmonisation 
and the WTO 
 
 The WTO provides a framework of binding rules together with an effective 
dispute resolution mechanism, however, with the raison d’être being solely that of 
global trade policy. Competition policy intersects with trade policy when anti-
competitive practice eliminates a foreign firm from a national market as effectively as 
a high tariff would, and when the national competition authority fails to provide a 
remedy for such conduct. Although international trade and competition policy are 
inter-related, this does not necessarily mean that the WTO is well equipped to take on 
anti-competitive issues. In contrast, the past proves that the WTO in its present 
capacity is incapable of dealing with competition issues satisfactorily. For instance, 
the Kodak-Fuji22 and Telmex23 cases show that the WTO was unable to properly 
address the problems of anti-competitive practices which foreclose market access. 
The WTO panel had a difficult dilemma to deal with the complex issue of private 
agreements and hybrid government–private restrictions (as the new barriers to a 
liberalised marketplace) in the absence of international competition rules and out of 
reach of international trade law as well as national competition laws. These cases 
suggest that in the situations where there is an interaction between private anti-
competitive practices and government measures involved, the WTO panel may 
exhibit a more cautious engagement of trade tools to address anti-competitive 
issues24. These examples also highlight the main differences between trade and 
competition policies; trade rules address governmental practices as opposed to the 
anti-competitive conduct by private firms covered under competition law. Along 
                                                 
22 WTO Japan – Measures affecting consumer photographic film and paper, 31 March 1998, 
WT/DS44/R 
23 WTO Mexico – Measures affecting Telecommunications Services 2 April 2004, WT/DS204/R 
24 For further discussion, see K. Lee, The WTO dispute settlement and anti-competitive practices: 
lessons learnt from trade disputes, the University of Oxford press, Working paper, 10/05. 
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similar lines, the differences in objectives may even further the problem. The WTO’s 
main task is to deal with trade policy, which is mainly concerned with market-access. 
If the scope of the WTO was extended to include competition rules (as suggested by 
some scholars25), then it may appear that competition policy at the WTO would be 
overwhelmed by the market access norms of trade policy at the expense of distorting 
the consumer welfare norm of competition law and policy, especially if there was a 
conflict between them, the WTO would most likely decide in favour of trade norms. 
No matter how these two sets of norms reconcile in theory, they cannot work happily 
in practice.26 This might suggest that a clear set of rules should be reached with the 
boundaries being made between trade and competition policies. Otherwise, when 
there is an overlap in competition and trade policy issues, different conclusions may 
be reached regarding the effect of a particular restraint. 
 The nature of competition issues is too complex to be cast in a binding 
international regime established and enforced by a dispute settlement body, such as 
the WTO which lacks the legitimacy and expertise to manoeuvre the difficult 
analytical tools of competition law. Lee argues that to allow WTO tribunals to 
exercise a judicial-creating or gap-filling role would stagger the legitimacy of not only 
the dispute settlement mechanism but also of the WTO system as a whole27. Along 
similar lines, Professor Jackson claims that the use of WTO tribunals to resolve 
competition policy disputes to “plug gaps” in the WTO agreement “places too much 
of the problem-solving burden on the dispute settlement process”.28 However, other 
scholars like Hansen have faith in the WTO and argues that the WTO can and should 
step into the legal gap concerning competition policy in order to safeguard the 
international trading system29. Furthermore, she suggests that a rule requiring 
governments to negotiate an adjustment for their policies that contain a 
                                                 
25 See, for instance, P. Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking “Reasonable Expectations”, 
72 Southern California Law Review, 1601, 1999. M. Dabbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust 
policy, Cambridge university press, 2003, pp. 224-225, ch.9. 
 
26For further discussion, see  DK Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 3, 2000, pp. 478-504 
27 K. Lee, The WTO dispute settlement and anti-competitive practices: lessons learnt from trade 
disputes, the University of Oxford press, Working paper, 10/05. 
28 In: Expert Warns of Burden to WTO Dispute Settlement, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 778 
May 6, 1998. 
29 P. Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking “Reasonable Expectations”, 72 Southern 
California Law Review, 1601, 1999. 
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disproportionate impact on imports is consistent with the text and purpose of the 
WTO. It is possible that governmental tolerance towards restrictive business practices 
could render existing commitments reached at the WTO meaningless, and encourage 
the behaviour that WTO rules were designed to prevent. The absence of specific rules 
for competition places a difficult task on the WTO tribunal to resolve disputes over 
these policies. However, the author disagrees that the WTO should stretch its powers 
in order to cover competition issues without having a consensus by its members on 
what competition rules should be, in what forms, and to what extent they should be 
addressed in international trade disputes? 
International anti-competitive practices bring nations of different economic 
development into contact with one another. Countries do not share common 
competition policy traditions; some of them do not even have any competition laws in 
place. Considering the complex nature of competition, reaching an agreement among 
many countries with too diverging competition cultures becomes a formidable task. 
For instance, the model of competition law from developed countries is not 
necessarily ideal for small, emerging market economies, or developing countries. It 
has been suggested that developed countries first developed an industrial policy and 
then modified it in the light of international commitments. During times of rapid 
structural change, developed countries could modify their competition policy to 
facilitate necessary changes; however, the same is not possible for economies in 
transition due to their international obligations and imposed models from the 
developed countries30. Parachuting competition laws from developed countries on 
developing countries would mean that they will not be able to develop competition 
rules to suit their own legal, economic and political conditions. Similarly, small 
market economies require different competition rules, as laxer competition rules. This 
is because there are a limited number of market players in small markets that the 
market can serve and in order for these countries to achieve economies of scale they 
would require to have more concentrated markets.31 Although the WTO to some 
extent addresses specific features of developing and less developed countries with 
regard to trade issues, it is not clear to what extent the specific attributes of 
                                                 
30 F. Vissi, Challenges and Questions around Competition Policy: the Hungarian Experience, 1995, 18 
Fordham International Law Journal 1230. Also, see M. Dabbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust 
policy, Cambridge university press, 2003, pp. 126-129. 
31 Gal, Competition policy for small market economies, Harvard University press, 2003. 
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developing or small countries would be taken into consideration vis-à-vis competition 
issues. 
Finally, benefits and costs analysis should also be mentioned. It may be the 
case that an international competition law agreement is not worth having if the gains 
to achieve it are outweighed by the implementation costs. Although there is a demand 
for international competition law, but in relation to the costs of an international 
regime, the benefits could be just too small. It has to be taken into account that each 
nation would have to deviate from its competition policy (presumably tailored to 
serve its needs) to compromise on a common international regime32.  
To summarise, an ‘ideal’ model, which assumes that “one size fits all” is 
unlikely to be created in the near future. The differences in competition law and 
policies and economic development between nations make the harmonisation an 
ambitious task that requires outstanding efforts from all members to reach consensus 
on multilateral agreement.  
Conclusion 
International competition law addresses complex issues. On the one hand, the 
globalisation process therefore international anti-competitive practices have initiated 
the negotiation of international competition rules and their importance. International 
competition law mechanism could cover global anti-competitive transactions 
unreachable by domestic competition authorities. It could eliminate contradictory 
decisions from different jurisdictions, and save time and costs for firms involved in 
international transactions, as well as provide legal certainty and transparency. 
However, on the other hand, reaching an agreement among many countries with too 
diverging competition cultures and at different development scales becomes a 
formidable task. Countries do not share common competition policy traditions; the 
model that suits developed countries is not necessarily ideal for developing countries. 
Although the WTO with its well established dispute resolution mechanism has its 
benefits, the lack of consensus among the nations on international competition policy 
and law suggests that an international system of antitrust is unlikely to appear on the 
horizon in the near future. 
                                                 
32 For further discussion, see Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart, 
2007, pp.1011-1012. 
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